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Abstract. The key-generation algorithm for the RSA cryptosystem is specified in
several standards, such as PKCS#1, IEEE 1363-2000, FIPS 186-3, ANSI X9.44, or
ISO/IEC 18033-2. All of them substantially differ in their requirements. This indi-
cates that for computing a “secure” RSA modulus it does not matter how exactly one
generates RSA integers. In this work we show that this is indeed the case to a large
extend: First, we give a theoretical framework that will enable us to easily compute
the entropy of the output distribution of the considered standards and show that it is
comparatively high. To do so, we compute for each standard the number of integers
they define (up to an error of very small order) and discuss different methods of gen-
erating integers of a specific form. Second, we show that factoring such integers is
hard, provided factoring a product of two primes of similar size is hard.
Keywords. RSA integer, output entropy, reduction. ANSI X9.44, FIPS 186-3,
IEEE 1363-2000, ISO/IEC 18033-2, NESSIE, PKCS#1, GnuPG, OpenSSL, Open-
Swan, SSH.
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1. Introduction
An RSA integer is an integer that is suitable as a modulus for the RSA cryptosystem as
proposed by Rivest, Shamir & Adleman (1977, 1978):
“You first compute n as the product of two primes p and q:
n = p · q.
These primes are very large, ’random’ primes. Although you will make n pub-
lic, the factors p and q will be effectively hidden from everyone else due to the
enormous difficulty of factoring n.”
Also in earlier literature such as Ellis (1970) or Cocks (1973) one does not find any further
restrictions. In subsequent literature people define RSA integers similarly to Rivest, Shamir
& Adleman: Crandall & Pomerance (2001) note that it is “fashionable to select approxi-
mately equal primes but sometimes one runs some further safety tests”. In more applied
works such as Schneier (1996) or Menezes et al. (1997) one can read that for maximum
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security one chooses two (distinct) primes of equal length. Also von zur Gathen & Gerhard
(2003) follow a similar approach. On suggestion of B. de Weger, Decker & Moree (2008)
define an RSA integer to be a product of two primes p and q such that p < q < rp for some
parameter r ∈ R>1. Real world implementations, however, require concrete algorithms
that specify in detail how to generate RSA integers. This has led to a variety of standards,
notably the standards PKCS#1 (Jonsson & Kaliski 2003), ISO 18033-2 (International Or-
ganization for Standards 2006), IEEE 1363-2000 (IEEE working group 2000), ANSI X9.44
(Accredited Standards Committee X9 2007), FIPS 186-3 (NIST 2009), the standard of the
RSA foundation (RSA Laboratories 2000), the standard set by the German Bundesnetza-
gentur (Wohlmacher 2009), and the standard resulting from the European NESSIE project
(Preneel et al. 2003). All of those standards define more or less precisely how to generate
RSA integers and all of them have substantially different requirements. This reflects the in-
tuition that it does not really matter how one selects the prime factors in detail, the resulting
RSA modulus will do its job. But what is needed to show that this is really the case?
Following Brandt & Damgård (1993) a quality measure of a generator is the entropy of
its output distribution. In abuse of language we will most of the time talk about the output
entropy of an algorithm. To compute it, we need estimates of the probability that a certain
outcome is produced. This in turn needs a thorough analysis of how one generates RSA
integers of a specific form. If we can show that the outcome of the algorithm is roughly
uniformly distributed, the output entropy is closely related to the count of RSA integers it
can produce. It will turn out that in all reasonable setups this count is essentially determined
by the desired length of the output, see Section 5. For primality tests there are several results
in this direction (see for example Joye & Paillier 2006) but we are not aware of any related
work analyzing the output entropy of algorithms for generating RSA integers.
Another requirement for the algorithm is that the output should be ‘hard to factor’. Since
this statement does not even make sense for a single integer, this means that one has to show
that the restrictions on the shape of the integers the algorithm produces do not introduce any
further possibilities for an attacker. To prove this, a reduction has to be given that reduces
the problem of factoring the output to the problem of factoring a product of two primes of
similar size, see Section 8. Also there it is necessary to have results on the count of RSA
integers of a specific form to make the reduction work. As for the entropy estimations, we
do not know any related work on this. A conference version of this article, focusing on
the analysis of standardized RSA key-generators only, was published in Loebenberger &
Nüsken (2011).
In the following section we will develop a formal framework that can handle all possi-
ble definitions for RSA integers. After discussing the necessary number theoretic tools in
Section 3, we give explicit formulæ for the count of such integers which will be used later
for entropy estimations of the various standards for RSA integers. In Section 4 we show
how our general framework can be instantiated, yielding natural definitions for several types
of RSA integers (as used later in the standards). The section afterwards compares in more
detail the relations of the different notions. Section 6 gives a short overview on generic
constructions for fast algorithms that generate such integers almost uniformly. At this point
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we will have described all necessary techniques to compute the output entropy, which we
discuss in Section 7. The following section resolves the second question described above
by giving a reduction from factoring special types of RSA integers to factoring a product of
two primes of similar size. We finish by applying our results to various standards for RSA
integers in Section 9.
2. RSA integers in general
If one generates an RSA integer it is necessary to select for each choice of the security
parameter the prime factors from a certain region. This security parameter is typically an
integer k that specifies (roughly) the size of the output. We use a more general definition
by asking for integers from the interval ]x/r, x], given a real bound x and a parameter r
(possibly depending on x). Clearly, this can also be used to model the former selection
process by setting x = 2k − 1 and r = 2. Let us in general introduce a notion of RSA
integers with tolerance r as a family
A := 〈Ax〉x∈R>1
of subsets of the positive quadrant R2>1, where for every x ∈ R>1
Ax ⊆
{
(y, z) ∈ R2>1
x
r
< yz ≤ x
}
.
The tolerance r shall always be larger than 1. We allow here that r varies with x, which of
course includes the case when r is a constant. Typical values used for RSA are r = 2 or
r = 4 which fix the bit-length of the modulus more or less. Now an A-integer n of size x
— for use as a modulus in RSA — is a product n = pq of a prime pair (p, q) ∈ Ax∩(P×P),
where P denotes the set of primes. They are counted by the associated prime pair counting
function #A for the notion A:
#A : R>1 −→ N,
x 7−→ # {(p, q) ∈ P× P (p, q) ∈ Ax} .
Thus everyA-integer n = pq is counted once or twice in #A (x) depending on whether only
(p, q) ∈ Ax or also (q, p) ∈ Ax, respectively. We call a notion symmetric if for all choices
of the parameters the corresponding area in the (y, z)-plane is symmetric with respect to the
main diagonal, i.e. that (y, z) ∈ Ax implies also (z, y) ∈ Ax. If to the contrary (y, z) ∈ Ax
implies (z, y) /∈ Ax we call the notion antisymmetric. When we are only interested in
the associated RSA integers we can always require symmetry or antisymmetry, yet many
algorithms proceed in an asymmetric way.
Note that varying r do not occur in standards and implementations for RSA integers,
analyzed in Section 9. However, there are still quite natural notions in which a varying r
occurs: Consider for example the notion where the primes p, q are selected from the interval
[x1/4, x1/2]. Then we obtain the product pq ∈ [x1/2, x]. This corresponds to the notion
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Figure 2.1: A generic notion of RSA integers with tolerance r. The gray area shows the
parts of the (ln y, ln z)-plane which is counted. It lies between the tolerance bounds lnx
and ln xr . The dashed lines show boundaries as imposed by [c1, c2]-balanced. The dotted
diagonal marks the criterion for symmetry.
discussed in Section 4.2 with r =
√
x. Indeed, all the counting theorems in Section 4 can
handle such large r. However, the error term is correspondingly large.
Certainly, we will also need restrictions on the shape of the area we are analyzing: If one
considers any notion of RSA integers and throws out exactly the prime pairs one would be
left with a prime-pair-free region and any approximation for the count of such a notion based
on the area would necessarily have a tremendously large error term. However, for practical
applications it turns out that it is enough to consider regions of a very specific form. Actually,
we will most of the time have regions whose boundary can be described by graphs of certain
smooth functions, see Definition 3.3(ii).
For RSA, people usually prefer two prime factors of roughly the same size, where size
is understood as bit length. Accordingly, we call a notion of RSA integers [c1, c2]-balanced
iff additionally for every x ∈ R>1
Ax ⊆
{
(y, z) ∈ R2>1 y, z ∈ [xc1 , xc2 ]
}
,
where 0 < c1 ≤ c2 can be thought of as constants or — more generally — as smooth func-
tions in x defining the amount of allowed divergence subject to the side condition that xc1
tends to infinity when x grows. If c1 > 12 then Ax is empty, so we will usually assume
c1 ≤ 12 . In order to prevent trial division from being a successful attacker it would be suf-
ficient to require y, z ∈ Ω (lnk x) for every k ∈ N. Our stronger requirement still seems
reasonable and indeed equals the condition Maurer (1995) required for secure RSA moduli,
as the supposedly most difficult factoring challenges stay within the range of our attention.
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Figure 2.2: Levels ek of the function eυ+ζυζ for k ∈ {2+ ε, 3, . . . , 8}. The darker the line the
higher is the value of k.
As a side-effect this greatly simplifies our approximations later. The German Bundesnetza-
gentur uses a very similar restriction in their algorithm catalog (Wohlmacher 2009). We can
— for a fixed choice of parameters — easily visualize any notion of RSA integers by the
corresponding region Ax in the (y, z)-plane. It is favorable to look at these regions in log-
arithmic scale: writing y = eυ and z = eζ , we depict the region (lnA)x in the (υ, ζ)-plane
corresponding to the region Ax in the (y, z)-plane, i.e. (υ, ζ) ∈ (lnA)x :⇔ (y, z) ∈ Ax.We
obtain a picture like in Figure 2.1.
Often the considered integers n = pq are also subject to further side conditions, like
gcd((p − 1)(q − 1), e) = 1 for some fixed public RSA exponent e. Most of the number
theoretic work below can easily be adapted, but for simplicity of exposition we will often
present our results without those further restrictions and just point out when necessary how
to incorporate such additional properties.
In Wohlmacher (2009) it is additionally required that the primes p and q are not too close
to each other. We ignore this issue here, since the probability that two primes are very close
to each other would be tiny if the notion from which (p, q) was selected is sufficiently large.
If necessary, we are able to modify our notions such that also this requirement is met.
In order to count the number of A-integers we have to evaluate
#A (x) =
∑
(p,q)∈Ax
p,q∈P
1.
If we follow the intuitive view that a randomly generated number n is prime with probability
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1
lnn , we expect that we have to evaluate integrals like
x
Ax
1
ln y ln z dz dy,
while carefully considering the error between those integrals and the above sums. In loga-
rithmic scale we obtain expressions of the form
s
(lnA)x
eυ+ζ
υζ dζ dυ. To get an understanding
of these functions, in Figure 2.2 some contour lines of the inner function are depicted. From
the figure we observe that pairs (υ, ζ) where υ+ζ is large have a higher weight in the overall
count.
As we usually deal with balanced notions the considered regions are somewhat centered
around the main diagonal. We will show in Section 8 that if factoring products of two primes
is hard then it is also hard to factor integers generated from such notions.
3. Toolbox
We will now develop the necessary number theoretic concepts to obtain formulæ for the
count of RSA integers that will later help us to estimate the output entropy of the various
standards for RSA integers. In related articles, like Decker & Moree (2008) one finds counts
for one particular definition of RSA integers. We believe that in the work presented here for
the first time a sufficiently general theorem is established that allows to compute the number
of RSA integers for all reasonable definitions.
We assume the Riemann hypothesis throughout the entire paper. The main terms are the
same without this assumption, but the error bounds one obtains are then much weaker. We
use the following version of the prime number theorem:
PRIME NUMBER THEOREM 3.1 (Von Koch 1901, Schoenfeld 1976). If (and only if) the
Riemann hypothesis holds, then for x ≥ 2657
|π(x)− li(x)| < 1
8π
√
x lnx,
where li(x) :=
∫ x
0
dt
ln t .
We first state a quite technical lemma that enables us to do our approximations:
LEMMA 3.2 (Prime sum approximation). Let f , f˜ , f̂ be functions [B,C] → R>1, where
B,C ∈ R>1 such that f˜ and f̂ are piecewise continuous, f˜ + f̂ is either weakly decreasing,
weakly increasing, or constant, and for p ∈ [B,C] we have the estimate∣∣∣f(p)− f˜(p)∣∣∣ ≤ f̂(p).
Further, let Ê(p) be a positive valued, continuously differentiable function of p bounding
|π(p) − li(p)| on [B,C]. (For example, under the Riemann hypothesis we can take Ê(p) =
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1
8π
√
p ln p provided B ≥ 2657.) Then∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
p∈P∩]B,C]
f(p)− g˜
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ĝ
with
g˜ =
∫ C
B
f˜(p)
ln p dp ,
ĝ =
∫ C
B
f̂(p)
ln p dp+2(f˜ + f̂)(B)Ê(B) + 2(f˜ + f̂)(C)Ê(C) +
∫ C
B
(
f˜ + f̂
)
(p)Ê′(p) dp .
In the special case when f˜ + f̂ is constant we have the better bound
ĝ =
∫ C
B
f̂(p)
ln p dp+(f˜ + f̂)(B)(Ê(B) + Ê(C))
PROOF. The proof can be done analogously to the proof of Lemma 2.1 in Loebenberger
& Nüsken (2010): First, rewrite ∑p∈P∩]B,C] f(p) as a Stieltjes integral ∫ CB f(p) dp. Then
integrate by parts, estimate π, and finally integrate by parts ‘backwards’. 
Next we formulate a lemma specialized to handle RSA notions. We cannot expect to
obtain an approximation of the number of prime pairs by the area of the region unless we
make certain restrictions.
The following definition describes the restrictions that we use. As you will notice, it
essentially enforces a certain monotonicity that allows the error estimation.
DEFINITION 3.3. Let A be a notion of RSA integers with tolerance r.
(i) The notion A is graph-bounded iff there are (at least) integrable boundary functions
B1, C1 : R>1 → R>1 and B2, C2 : R2>1 → R>1 such that we can write
Ax =
{
(y, z) ∈ R2>1
B1(x) < y ≤ C1(x),
B2(y, x) < z ≤ C2(y, x)
}
,
where for all x ∈ R>1 and all y ∈ ]B1(x), C1(x)[ we have 1 < B1(x) ≤ C1(x) ≤ x
and 1 < B2(y, x) < C2(y, x) ≤ x.
(ii) The notion A is monotone at x (relative to the error bound Ê) for some x ∈ R>1 iff it
is graph-bounded and the function∫ C2(p,x)
B2(p,x)
1
ln q dq+Ê(B2(p, x)) + Ê(C2(p, x))
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is either weakly increasing, weakly decreasing, or constant as a function in p restricted
to the interval [B1(x), C1(x)]. If not mentioned otherwise we refer to the error bound
given by Ê(p) = 18π
√
p ln p.
We call the notion A monotone iff it is monotone at each x ∈ R>1 where Ax 6= ∅.
(iii) The notion A is piecewise monotone iff there is a parameter m ∈ N such that
Ax :=
m⊎
j=1
Aj,x,
where Aj,. are all monotone notions of RSA integers of tolerance r. Note that we may
also allow m to depend on x.
For (i) note that B1(x) = C1(x) allows to describe an empty set Ax, and otherwise the
inequality B2(y, x) 6= C2(y, x) makes sure that all four bounding functions are determined
by Ax as long as y ∈ ]B1(x), C1(x)[. This condition enforces that Ax is (path) connected.
We do not need that but also it does no harm. For (iii) observe that in the light of a multi-
application of Lemma 3.6 we would be on the safe side if we require m ∈ lnO(1) x. At
the extreme m ∈ o
(
c1x
1−c
4 lnx
)
with c = max (2c2 − 1, 1 − 2c1) is necessary for any
meaningful result generalizing Lemma 3.6. As in particular (ii) is rather weird to verify we
provide an easily checkable, sufficient condition for monotonicity of a notion.
LEMMA 3.4. Assume A is a graph-bounded notion of RSA integers with tolerance r given
by continuously differentiable functions B1, C1 : R>1 → R>1 and B2, C2 : R2>1 → R>1.
Finally, let x ∈ R>1 be such that
◦ the function B2(p, x) is weakly decreasing in p and
◦ the function C2(p, x) is weakly increasing in p
for p ∈ ]B1(x), C1(x)], or vice versa. As usual let Ê(p) be the function given by Ê(p) =
1
8π
√
p ln p. Then the notion A is monotone at x (relative to Ê).
PROOF. The goal is to show that the function
h(p) :=
∫ C2(p,x)
B2(p,x)
1
ln q
dq+Ê(B2(p, x)) + Ê(C2(p, x))
is weakly increasing or weakly decreasing in p. We write B′2(p, x) and C ′2(p, x), respec-
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tively, for the derivative with respect to p. Note that
h′(p) :=
(
1
lnC2(p, x)
+
2 + lnC2(p, x)
16π
√
C2(p, x)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
C ′2(p, x)
−
(
1
lnB2(p, x)
− 2 + lnB2(p, x)
16π
√
B2(p, x)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
B′2(p, x).
Some simple calculus shows that the second underbraced term is always positive since
B2(p, x) > 1. Thus if B2(p, x) is weakly decreasing and C2(p, x) is weakly increasing,
we have that h(p) is weakly increasing. If on the other hand B2(p, x) is weakly increasing
and C2(p, x) is weakly decreasing it follows that h(p) is weakly decreasing. 
Clearly, the conditions of the lemma are not necessary. We can easily extended it, for exam-
ple, as follows:
LEMMA 3.5. Assume A is a graph-bounded notion of RSA integers with tolerance r given
by continuously differentiable functions B1, C1 : R>1 → R>1 and B2, C2 : R2>1 → R>1.
Further, individually for each x ∈ R>1, the functions B2(p, x) and C2(p, x) are both weakly
increasing in p for p ∈ ]B1(x), C1(x)]. Then there are two monotone notions A1 and A2
with tolerance r, both having Aix ⊆ R≥B1(x) × R≥B2(B1(x),x) for all x, such that A =
A1 \ A2.
PROOF. Let A(x) := B2(B1(x), x). We define two [c1, c2]-balanced graph-bounded no-
tions A1, A2 of RSA integers by the following: the first notion A1 is defined by the func-
tions B11 := B1, C11 := C1, B12(p, x) := A(x) and C12 := C2. The second notion A2 is
defined by the functions B11 := B1, C11 := C1, B22(p, x) := A(x) and C22 := B2. Since
x/r < B1(x)B2(B1(x), x) = B1(x)A(x) both new notions have tolerance r as well. Then
A1, A2 are by Lemma 3.4 both monotone and A = A1 \ A2. 
A similar result with B2 and C2 both weakly decreasing is more difficult to obtain while
simultaneously retaining the tolerance. A particularly difficult example is the maximal no-
tion Mr,c1 given by Mr,c1x =
{
(y, z) ∈ R2>1 xr < yz ≤ x ∧ y, z ≥ xc1
}
. The following
lemma covers all the estimation work. Notice that we could in principle obtain explicit
values for the O () constant based on Lemma 3.2 but the expressions are rather ugly.
LEMMA 3.6 (Two-dimensional prime sum approximation for monotone notions). Assume
that we have a monotone [c1, c2]-balanced notion A of RSA integers with tolerance r, where
0 < c1 ≤ c2. (The values r, c1, c2 are allowed to vary with x.) Then under the Riemann
hypothesis there is a value a˜(x) ∈
[
1
4c22
, 1
4c21
]
such that
#A (x) ∈ a˜(x) · 4 area(Ax)
ln2 x
+O
(
c−11 x
3+c
4
)
,
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where c = max (2c2 − 1, 1− 2c1).
Note that the following proof gives a precise expression for a˜(x), namely
a˜(x) =
s
Ax
1
ln p ln q dp dq
4
s
Ax
1
ln2 x dp dq
.
It turns out that we can only evaluate a˜(x) numerically in our case and so we tend to estimate
also this term. Then we often obtain a˜(x) ∈ 1 + o(1). Admittedly, this mostly eats up the
advantage obtained by using the Riemann hypothesis. However, we accept this because it
still leaves the option of going through that difficult evaluation and obtain a much more
precise answer. If we do not use the Riemann hypothesis we need to replace O
(
c−11 x
3+c
4
)
with O
(
x
lnk x
)
for any k > 2 of your choice.
PROOF. Fix any x ∈ R>1. In case area(Ax) = 0 the claim holds with any desired a˜(x)
and zero big-Oh term. We can thus assume that the area is positive. As the statement is
asymptotic and xc1 tends to ∞ with x we can further assume that xc1 ≥ 2657. Abbreviating
h˜(x) = 4 area(Ax)ln2 x , we prove that there exists a value a˜(x) ∈
[
1
4c22
, 1
4c21
]
such that∣∣∣#A (x) − a˜(x) · h˜(x)∣∣∣ ≤ ĥ(x)
with
ĥ(x) =
1
4πc1
(
7− 6c2 + 12lnx
)
x
1+c2
2 +
1
8π2
· x 12+ 2 ln ln xln x + 1
4πc1
(
1 +
4
lnx
)
x1−
c1
2 .
This is slightly more precise and implies the claim.
Since the given notion is [c1, c2]-balanced with tolerance r for any (y, z) ∈ Ax we have
x
r ≤ yz ≤ x and y, z ∈ [xc1 , xc2 ] which implies ln y, ln z ∈ [c1, c2] ln x. Equivalently, we
have
xc1 ≤ B1(x) ≤ C1(x) ≤ xc2(3.7)
and for y ∈ ]B1(x), C1(x)[ we have
x
ry
≤ B2(y, x) < C2(y, x) ≤ x
y
(3.8)
and
xc1 ≤ B2(y, x) < C2(y, x) ≤ xc2 .(3.9)
From (3.8) we infer that for all y ∈ ]B1(x), C1(x)[ we have
x
r
≤ yB2(y, x) ≤ x and x
r
≤ yC2(y, x) ≤ x.(3.10)
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In order to estimate
#A (x) =
∑
p∈P∩]B1(x),C1(x)]
∑
q∈P∩]B2(p,x),C2(p,x)]
1,
we apply Lemma 3.2 twice. Since xc1 ≥ 2657 and so B2(p, x) ≥ 2657 for the considered p
we obtain for the inner sum∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
q∈P∩]B2(p,x),C2(p,x)]
1 − g˜1(p, x)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ĝ1(p, x),
where
g˜1(p, x) =
∫ C2(p,x)
B2(p,x)
1
ln q dq ,
ĝ1(p, x) = Ê(B2(p, x)) + Ê(C2(p, x)),
since we can use the special case of constant functions in Lemma 3.2. Because we are work-
ing under the restriction that the notion is monotone, i.e. g˜1(p, x) + ĝ1(p, x) is monotone,
we are able to apply the lemma a second time. Since xc1 ≥ 2657 and so B1(x) ≥ 2657 we
obtain ∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
p∈P∩]B1(x),C1(x)]
∑
q∈P∩]B2(p,x),C2(p,x)]
1 − g˜2(x)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ĝ2(x),
where
g˜2(x) =
∫ C1(x)
B1(x)
∫ C2(p,x)
B2(p,x)
1
ln p ln q dq dp ,
ĝ2(x) =
1
8pi
∫ C1(x)
B1(x)
(√
B2(p, x) lnB2(p, x) +
√
C2(p, x) lnC2(p, x)
)
·
(
1
ln p +
ln p+ 2
2
√
p
)
dp
+
1
4pi
√
B1(x) lnB1(x)
∫ C2(B1(x),x)
B2(B1(x),x)
1
ln q dq
+
1
4pi
√
C1(x) lnC1(x)
∫ C2(C1(x),x)
B2(C1(x),x)
1
ln q dq
+
1
32pi2
√
B1(x) lnB1(x)
(√
B2(B1(x), x) ln (B2(B1(x), x)) +
√
C2(B1(x), x) ln (C2(B1(x), x))
)
+
1
32pi2
√
C1(x) lnC1(x)
(√
B2(C1(x), x) ln (B2(C1(x), x)) +
√
C2(C1(x), x) ln (C2(C1(x), x))
)
+
1
8pi
∫ C1(x)
B1(x)
∫ C2(p,x)
B2(p,x)
ln p+ 2
2
√
p ln q dq dp .
It remains to estimate g˜2(x) and ĝ2(x) suitably sharply.
For (p, q) ∈ Ax we frequently use the estimate ln p, ln q ∈ [c1, c2] lnx. For the main
term we obtain
g˜2(x) ∈
[
1
4c22
,
1
4c21
]
4 area(Ax)
ln2 x
.
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We also read off the exact expression a˜(x) = ln2 x4 area(Ax) g˜2(x).
We treat the error term ĝ2(x) part by part. For the first term we obtain
1
8π
∫ C1(x)
B1(x)
(√
B2(p, x) lnB2(p, x) +
√
C2(p, x) lnC2(p, x)
)
·
(
1
ln p
+
ln p+ 2
2
√
p
)
dp
≤ 1
4π
∫ xc2
xc1
√
x
p
ln
(
x
p
)
· 3ln p dp
≤ 3
4π
1
c1 lnx
∫ xc2
xc1
√
x
p
ln
(
x
p
)
dp
≤ 3
2π
1
c1
(
1− c2 + 2lnx
)
x
1+c2
2 ∈ O
(
c−11 x
1+c2
2
)
,
where we used in the second line that ln p+22√p ≤ 2ln p for all p ≥ 2. Basic calculus shows that
ln p(ln p+2)
2
√
p is maximal at p = exp(
√
5 + 1), where it is less than 1.68. For the fourth line
note that ∫ √
x
p
ln
(
x
p
)
dp= 2p
√
x
p
(
ln
(
x
p
)
+ 2
)
.
The definite integral is not greater than this function evaluated at p = xc2 since c1 ≤ 12 .
Using c2 ≥ 0 gives the claim.
The second term yields
1
8π
√
B1(x) lnB1(x)
∫ C2(B1(x),x)
B2(B1(x),x)
1
ln q dq
≤ 1
8πc1 lnx
√
B1(x)C2(B1(x), x) lnB1(x)
≤ 1
8πc1
x
1+c2
2 ∈ O
(
c−11 x
1+c2
2
)
,
since we have
√
B1(x)C2(B1(x), x)
√
C2(B1(x), x) ≤ x
1+c2
2 and lnB1(x) ≤ lnx.
Similarly we obtain for the third term
1
8π
√
C1(x) lnC1(x)
∫ C2(C1(x),x)
B2(C1(x),x)
1
ln q
dq
≤ 1
8πc1
x
1+c2
2 ∈ O
(
c−11 x
1+c2
2
)
,
using
√
C1(x)C2(C1(x), x)
√
C2(C1(x), x) ≤ x
1+c2
2 and lnC1(x) ≤ lnx.
The fourth term yields
1
32π2
√
B1(x) lnB1(x)
(√
B2(B1(x), x) lnB2(B1(x), x) +
√
C2(B1(x), x) lnC2(B1(x), x)
)
≤ 1
16π2
√
x ln2 x ∈ O
(
x
1+c2
2
)
,
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where we used (3.10) and the (very weak) bound lnB1(x), lnC2(p, x) ≤ lnx. The fifth
term can be treated similarly. We finish by observing for the sixth term
1
8π
∫ C1(x)
B1(x)
∫ C2(p,x)
B2(p,x)
ln p+ 2
2
√
p ln q dq dp
≤ 1
8π
1
c1 lnx
∫ C1(x)
B1(x)
∫ C2(p,x)
B2(p,x)
ln p√
p
dq dp
≤ 1
8π
1
c1 lnx
∫ xc2
xc1
ln p√
p
∫ x
p
0
dq dp
≤ 1
8π
1
c1 lnx
· x ·
∫ xc2
xc1
ln p
p3/2
dp
≤ 1
4π
1
c1
(
1 +
4
lnx
)
x1−
c1
2
∈ O
(
c−11 x
1− c1
2
)
using B1(x) ≥ xc1 , c1 ≤ 12 , and∫ ln p
p3/2
dp= −2(ln p+ 2)√
p
.
This completes the proof. 
In specific situations one may obtain better estimates. In particular, when we substitute
C2(p, x) by x/p in the estimation of the sixth summand of the error we may loose much.
Of course we can generalize this lemma to notions composed of few monotone ones. We
leave the details to the reader. As mentioned before, in many standards the selection of the
primes p and q is additionally subject to the side condition that gcd((p − 1)(q − 1), e) = 1
for some fixed public exponent e of the RSA cryptosystem. To handle these restrictions, we
prove
THEOREM 3.11. Let e ∈ N>2 be a public RSA exponent and x ∈ R. Then under the
Extended Riemann Hypothesis we have for the number πe(x) of primes p ≤ x with gcd(p−
1, e) = 1 that
πe(x) ∈ ϕ1(e)
ϕ(e)
· li(x) +O (√x lnx) ,
where li(x) =
∫ x
0
1
ln t dt is the integral logarithm, ϕ(e) is Euler’s totient function and
(3.12) ϕ1(e)
ϕ(e)
=
∏
ℓ|e
ℓ prime
(
1− 1
ℓ− 1
)
.
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PROOF. We first show that the number of elements in Z×e ∩ (1 + Z×e ) is exactly ϕ1(e).
Write e =
∏
ℓ|e
ℓ prime
ℓf(ℓ). Observe that by the Chinese Remainder Theorem we have
Z
×
e ∩ (1 + Z×e ) =
⊕
ℓ|e
ℓ prime
(
Z
×
ℓf(ℓ)
∩ (1 + Z×
ℓf(ℓ)
)
)
and each factor in this expression has size (ℓ− 2)ℓf(ℓ)−1. Multiplying up all factors gives
#(Z×e ∩ (1 + Z×e )) =
∏
ℓ|e
ℓ prime
(
1− 1
ℓ− 1
)(
1− 1
ℓ
)
ℓf(ℓ) = ϕ1(e).
To show the result for πe(x) note that Oesterlé (1979) implies the following quantitative
version of Dirichlet’s theorem on the number πe;a(x) of primes p ≤ x with p ≡ a ∈ Ze
when gcd(a, e) = 1 under the Extended Riemann Hypothesis∣∣∣∣πe;a(x)− 1ϕ(e) · li(x)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ √x(lnx+ 2 ln e).
This is also documented in Bach & Shallit (1996, Theorem 8.8.18). We now have to sum
over ϕ1(e) residue classes and so obtain
πe(x) ∈ ϕ1(e)
ϕ(e)
· li(x) +O (ϕ1(e)√x lnx) ,
which proves the claim. 
This theorem shows that the prime pair approximation in Lemma 3.6 can be easily adapted
to RSA integers whose prime factors satisfy the conditions of Theorem 3.11 (when assuming
the Extended Riemann Hypothesis), since the density of such primes differs for every fixed
e essentially just by a multiplicative constant compared to the density of arbitrary primes.
4. Some common definitions for RSA integers
We will now give formal definitions of three specific notions of RSA integers. In particular,
we consider the following example definitions within our framework:
◦ The number theoretically inspired notion following Decker & Moree. Note that this
occurs in no standard and no implementation.
◦ The simple construction given by just choosing two primes in given intervals. This
construction occurs in several standards, like the standard of the RSA foundation
(RSA Laboratories 2000), the standard resulting from the European NESSIE project
(Preneel et al. 2003) and the FIPS 186-3 standard (NIST 2009). Also open source
implementations of OpenSSL (Cox et al. 2009), GnuPG (Skala et al. 2009) and the
GNU crypto library GNU Crypto (Free Software Foundation 2009) use some variant
of this construction.
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◦ An algorithmically inspired construction which allows one prime being chosen arbi-
trarily and the second is chosen such that the product is in the desired interval. This
was for example specified as the IEEE standard 1363 (IEEE working group 2000),
Annex A.16.11. However, we could not find any implementation following this stan-
dard.
ln y
ln z
ADM(r)
ln y
ln z
AALG1(r)
ln y
ln z
AFB(r,0)
ln y
ln z
AFB(r, 12 )
ln y
ln z
AFB(r,1)
Figure 4.1: Three notions of RSA integers.
4.1. A number theoretically inspired notion. In Decker & Moree (2008) on the sugges-
tion of B. de Weger, the number Cr (x) of RSA integers up to x was defined as the count of
numbers whose two prime factors differ by at most a factor r, namely
Cr (x) := #
{
n ∈ N ∃p, q ∈ P :
n = pq ∧ p < q < rp ∧ n ≤ x
}
.
Written as a notion of RSA integers in the sense above, we analyze
ln y
ln z
(4.1) ADM(r) :=
〈{
(y, z) ∈ R2 y
r
< z < ry ∧ x
r
< yz ≤ x
}〉
x∈R>1
.
Note that the prime pair counting function of this notion is closely related to the function
Cr (x): Namely we have
#ADM(r) (x) = 2
(
Cr (x)− Cr
(x
r
))
+
(
π
(√
x
)− π(√x
r
))
,
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where the last part is comparatively small. We now analyze the behavior of the function
#ADM(r) (x) under the Riemann hypothesis. Similar to Decker & Moree (2008), we rewrite
(4.2) 1
2
·#ADM(r) (x) =
∑
p∈P∩
]√
x
r
,
√
x
r
]
∑
q∈P∩
]
x
rp
,rp
]
1
+
∑
p∈P∩]
√
x
r
,
√
x]
∑
q∈P∩
]
p,x
p
]
1 +
π (
√
x)− π (√xr )
2
.
With these bounds we obtain using Lemma 3.6:
THEOREM 4.3. Under the Riemann hypothesis we have
#ADM(r) (x) ∈ a˜(x) 4x
ln2 x
(
ln r − ln r
r
)
+O
(
x
3
4 r
1
2
)
with a˜(x) ∈
[(
1− ln rln x+ln r
)2
,
(
1 + 2 ln rlnx−2 ln r
)2]
. This makes sense as long as r ∈ O(x 12−ε)
for some ε > 0. If additionally ln r ∈ o(lnx) then a˜(x) ∈ 1 + o(1).
You may want to sum this up as #ADM(r) (x) ∈ (1 + o(1)) 4xln2 x
(
ln r − ln rr
)
. However, you
then forego the option of actually calculating a˜(x).
PROOF. Consider x large enough such that all sum boundaries are beyond 2657, i.e.
√
x
r ≥
2657. By definition ADM(r) is a notion of tolerance r. Further it is [c1, c2]-balanced with
c1 = logx
(√
x
r
)
= 12 − ln rln x and c2 = logx (
√
rx) = 12 +
ln r
2 lnx . As depicted next to (4.1),
we treat the upper half of the notion as the union of those two notions matching the two
double sums in (4.2), which both inherit being [c1, c2]-balanced of tolerance r. Considering
the inner bounds xrp to rp and p to
x
p , respectively, as a function of the outer variable p, we
observe that the lower and upper bound in each case have opposite monotonicity behavior
and thus by Lemma 3.4 each part is a monotone notion. We can thus apply Lemma 3.6.
Under the restriction ln r ∈ o(lnx) we have c1, c2 ∈ 12 + o(1), which implies that 1c2i ∈
4 (1 + o(1)) for both i ∈ {1, 2}. Computing the area of the two parts yields∫ √x
r
√
x
r
∫ rp
x
rp
1 dq dp= 1
2
· x
(
1− ln r
r
− 1
r
)
and ∫ √x
√
x
r
∫ x
p
p
1 dq dp= 1
2
· x
(
ln r − 1 + 1
r
)
.
For the error term we obtain O(x 34 r 12 ) noting that the number π (√x) of prime squares up
to x is at most
√
x. 
Notions for RSA integers 17
Actually, we can even prove that the error term is in O
(
x
3
4 r
1
4
)
. We lost this in the last steps
of the proof of Lemma 3.6 when we replaced C2(p, x) = rp by x/p.
4.2. A fixed bound notion. A second possible definition for RSA integers can be stated as
follows: We consider the number of integers smaller than a real positive bound x that have
exactly two prime factors p and q, both lying in a fixed interval ]B,C], in formula:
π2B,C (x) := #
{
n ∈ N ∃p, q ∈ P ∩ ]B,C] :
n = pq ∧ n ≤ x
}
.
To avoid problems with rare prime squares, which are also not interesting when talking about
RSA integers, we instead count
ln y
ln z
κ2B,C (x) := #
{
(p, q) ∈ (P ∩ ]B,C])2 pq ≤ x
}
.
Such functions are treated in Loebenberger & Nüsken (2010) .
In the context of RSA integers we consider the notion
(4.4) AFB(r,σ) :=
〈{
(y, z) ∈ R2>1
√
x
r
< y, z ≤ √rσx ∧ yz ≤ x
}〉
x∈R>1
with σ ∈ [0, 1]. The parameter σ describes the (relative) distance of the restriction yz ≤ x to
the center of the rectangle in which y and z are allowed. We split the corresponding counting
function into two double sums:
(4.5) #AFB(r,σ) (x) =
∑
p∈P∩]
√
x
r
,
√
x
rσ ]
∑
q∈P∩]
√
x
r
,
√
rσx]
1
+
∑
p∈P∩]
√
x
rσ
,
√
rσx]
∑
q∈P∩
]√
x
r
,x
p
]
1.
The next theorem follows directly from Loebenberger & Nüsken (2010) but we can also
derive it from Lemma 3.6 similar to Theorem 4.3.
THEOREM 4.6. We have under the Riemann hypothesis
#AFB(r,σ) (x) ∈ a˜(x) 4x
ln2 x
(
σ ln r + 1− 2
r
1−σ
2
+
1
r
)
+O
(
x
3
4 r
1
4
)
with a˜(x) ∈
[(
1− σ ln rln x+σ ln r
)2
,
(
1 + ln rln x−ln r
)2]
. If additionally ln r ∈ o(lnx) then a˜ ∈
1 + o(1).
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PROOF. Let x be such that all sum boundaries are beyond 2657. By definition AFB(r,σ)
is a notion of tolerance r. Further for all σ ∈ [0, 1] it is clearly [c1, c2]-balanced with
c1 = logx
√
x
r =
1
2 − ln
√
r
lnx and c2 = logx
√
rσx = 12 +
σ ln r
2 lnx . As depicted next to (4.4), we
treat the notion as the union of two notions corresponding to the two double sums in (4.5),
which are both [c1, c2]-balanced of tolerance r.
Consider the inner bounds
√
x
r to
√
rσx and
√
x
r to
x
p respectively, as a function of the
outer variable p (while σ is fixed): We observe that the lower and upper bound in the first
case are constant and in the second case consist of a constant lower bound and an weakly
decreasing upper bound. Thus by Lemma 3.4 each part is a monotone notion and we can
apply Lemma 3.6.
As in the proof of Theorem 4.3, we have under the additional restriction ln r ∈ o(ln(x))
that 1
c2i
∈ 4 (1 + o(1)) for both i ∈ {1, 2}. Computing the area of the two parts yields
∫ √rσx
√
x
rσ
∫ x
p
√
x
r
1 dq dp= x
(
σ ln r + 1
r(1+σ)/2
− 1
r(1−σ)/2
)
and ∫ √ x
rσ
√
x
r
∫ √rσx
√
x
r
1 dq dp= x
(
1− 1
r(1−σ)/2
− 1
r(1+σ)/2
+
1
r
)
For the error term we obtain O
(
x
3
4 r
1
4
)
. 
4.3. An algorithmically inspired notion. A third option to define RSA integers is the
following notion: Assume you wish to generate an RSA integer between xr and x, which
has two prime factors of roughly equal size. Then algorithmically we might first generate
the prime p and afterward select the prime q such that the product is in the correct interval.
As we will see later, this procedure does — however — not produce every number with the
same probability, see Section 6. Formally, we consider the notion
ln y
ln z
(4.7) AALG1(r) :=
〈(y, z) ∈ R2>1
√
x
r < y ≤
√
x,
x
ry < z ≤ xy ,
x
r < yz ≤ x

〉
x∈R>1.
We proceed with this notion similar to the previous one. By observing
(4.8) #AALG1(r) (x) =
∑
p∈P∩
]√
x
r
,
√
x
]
∑
q∈P∩
]√
x,x
p
]
1
+
∑
p∈P∩
]√
x
r
,
√
x
]
∑
q∈P∩
]
x
rp
,
√
x
]
1,
and again applying Lemma 3.6 and Lemma 3.4 we obtain
Notions for RSA integers 19
THEOREM 4.9. We have under the Riemann hypothesis
#AALG1(r) (x) ∈ a˜(x) 4x
ln2 x
(
ln r − ln r
r
)
+O
(
x
3
4 r
1
2
)
with a˜(x) ∈
[(
1− 2 ln rlnx+2 ln r
)2
,
(
1 + 2 ln rln x−2 ln r
)2]
. If additionally ln r ∈ o(ln x) then
a˜ ∈ 1 + o(1).
PROOF. Again let x be such that all sum boundaries are beyond 2657. By definition
AALG1(r) is a notion of tolerance r. Further it is clearly [c1, c2]-balanced with c1 = logx
√
x
r =
1
2 − ln rln x and c2 = logx r
√
x = 12 +
ln r
ln x . As depicted next to (4.7), we treat the notion as
the union of two notions corresponding to the two double sums in (4.8), which are both
[c1, c2]-balanced of tolerance r.
If we consider the inner bounds
√
x to xp and
x
rp to
√
x, respectively, as a function of
the outer variable p, we observe that in both cases one of them is constant and the other
decreasing. Furthermore by Lemma 3.4 each part is a monotone notion. We can thus apply
Lemma 3.6.
As for the previous notions we have under the additional restriction ln r ∈ o(ln(x)) that
1
c2
i
∈ 4 (1 + o(1)) for both i ∈ {1, 2}. Computing the area of the two parts yields
∫ √x
√
x
r
∫ x
p
√
x
1 dq dp= x
(
1− ln r
r
− 1
r
)
and ∫ √x
√
x
r
∫ √x
x
rp
1 dq dp= x
(
ln r − 1 + 1
r
)
.
For the error term we obtain O
(
x
3
4 r
1
2
)
. 
Note that we also could have employed Lemma 3.5, but in this particular case we decided to
use another split of the notion.
The IEEE standard P1363 suggest a slight variant, both generalize to
(4.10) AALG(r,σ)(x) :=
〈(y, z) ∈ R2>1
rσ−1
√
x < y ≤ rσ√x,
x
ry < z ≤ xy ,
x
r < yz ≤ x

〉
x∈R>1
,
with σ ∈ [0, 1]. Now, our notion above is AALG(r,0), and the IEEE variant is AALG(r, 12 ). By
similar reasoning as above we obtain
20 Loebenberger & Nüsken
THEOREM 4.11. We have under the Riemann hypothesis
#AALG(r,σ) (x) ∈ a˜(x) 4x
ln2 x
(
ln r − ln r
r
)
+O
(
x
3
4 r
1
2
)
,
with a˜(x) ∈
[(
1− 2σ′ ln rln x+2σ′ ln r
)2
,
(
1 + 2(1+σ) ln rlnx−2(1+σ) ln r
)2]
, where σ′ = max(σ, 1 − σ). If
additionally ln r ∈ o(lnx) then a˜(x) ∈ 1 + o(1) 
4.4. Summary. As we see, all notions, summarized in Figure 4.1, open a slightly different
view. However the outcome is not that different, at least the numbers of described RSA
integers are quite close to each other, see Section 5.
Current standards and implementations of various crypto packages mostly use the no-
tions AFB(4,0), AFB(4,1), AFB(2,0) or AALG(2,1/2). For details see Section 9.
5. Arbitrary notions
The preceding examinations show that the order of the analyzed functions differ by a factor
that only depends on the notion parameters, i.e. on r and σ, summarizing:
THEOREM. Assuming ln r ∈ o(lnx) and r > 1 and σ ∈ [0, 1] we have
(i) #ADM(r) (x) ∈ (1 + o(1)) 4xln2 x
(
ln r − ln rr
)
,
(ii) #AFB(r,σ) (x) ∈ (1 + o(1)) 4xln2 x
(
σ ln r + 1− 2
r
1−σ
2
+ 1r
)
,
(iii) #AALG1(r) (x) ∈ (1 + o(1)) 4xln2 x
(
ln r − ln rr
)
. 
It is obvious that the three considered notions with many parameter choices cover about the
same number of integers.
To obtain a much more general result, we consider the following maximal notion
ln y
ln z
(5.1) Mr,c1 :=
〈(y, z) ∈ R2>1
xc1 < y ≤ x1−c1 ,
xc1 < z ≤ x1−c1 ,
x
r < yz ≤ x

〉
x∈R>1.
All of the notions discussed in Section 4 are subsets of this notion. Using the same tech-
niques as above, we obtain:
THEOREM 5.2. For ln r ∈ o(lnx) we have under the Riemann hypothesis
(i) For c1 ≤ 12 − ln r2 lnx and for some ℓ and large x additionally c1 > 12 − lnℓ x ln r, we
have that
#Mr,c1 (x) ∈ a˜(x) 4x
ln2 x
(
(1 − 2c1)
(
1− 1
r
)
lnx− 1 + ln r + 1
r
)
+O
(
c−1x1−
c1
2 lnℓ+1
)
,
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(ii) when c1 > 12 − ln r2 ln x , we obtain the fixed bound notion
#Mr,c1 (x) ∈ a˜(x) 4x
ln2 x
(
(1− 2c1) lnx+ 1
x1−2c1
− 1
)
+O
(
c−11 · x1−
c1
2 x
)
.
This is independent of r.
In both cases a˜(x) ∈
[
1
4(1−c1)2 ,
1
4c21
]
. In particular for c1 ∈ 12+o(1) we have a˜(x) ∈ 1+o(1).
Case (i) considers the case where the notion Mr,c1 looks like a thin band. The other
alternative (ii) treats the case where the notion is actually a triangle, namely the notion
AFB(x1−2c1 ,1). In the former case we have to make sure that the band is not too long so that
we may apply Lemma 3.6 for not too many pieces. As noted after Definition 3.3, the first
case could still be somewhat extended.
PROOF. As usual let x be such that all sum boundaries are beyond 2657. By definition
Mr,c1 is a notion of tolerance r. Further it is clearly [c1, 1− c1]-balanced. For c1 > 12− ln r2 lnx
the result follows directly from Theorem 4.6, since Mr,c1 is simply the fixed bound notion
AFB(x1−2c1 ,1).
For c1 ≤ 12 − ln r2 lnx we treat the notion as the sum of several monotone, [c1, 1 − c1]-
balanced notions of tolerance r by triangulating the maximal notion as indicated in the pic-
ture next to (5.1). The number m of necessary cuts is (1− 2c1) ln xln r which is in O
(
lnℓ+1 x
)
by assumption. This gives by Lemma 3.6 the claim. 
We obtain
THEOREM 5.3. Let c1, c2 ∈ 12 + o(1), r > 1 with ln r ∈ Ω
(
1−2c1
lnℓ x
)
∩ o(ln x) be possibly
x-dependent values, and a ∈ ]0, 1[ constant. Consider a piecewise monotone notion A of
RSA integers with tolerance r such that for large x ∈ R>1 we have areaAx ≥ ax. Then
#A (x) = 4x
ln2 x
· a˜(x)
where a˜(x) ∈ o(lnx) and a˜(x) ≥ a− ε(x) for some ε(x) ∈ o(1).
In particular, the prime pair counts of two such notions can differ by at most a factor of
order o(lnx).
PROOF. Let A be as specified. Assume x to be large enough to grant that areaAx ≥ ax
and xc1 > 2657. Without loss of generality we assume c1 + c2 ≤ 1. Otherwise we replace
c2 = 1− c1. Denote c := max(2c2−1, 1−2c1), this now is always in [0, 1]. By Lemma 3.6
we obtain
#A (x) ≥ a 4x
ln2 x
− â(x), â(x) ∈ O(x 3+c4 ).
To provide an upper bound, we consider the [c1, 1− c1]-balanced maximal notion (5.1). As
mentioned above we have for all x ∈ R>1 that Ax ⊆Mr,c1x , and so #A (x) ≤ #Mr,c1 (x).
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Figure 5.1: Enclosing notions of RSA integers using others.
Note that c1 ≤ 12 , as otherwise Ax would be empty rather than having area at least ax. By
assumption we have c1 ∈ 12 + o(1) and thus 0 ≤ 1 − 2c1 ∈ o(1). Now the claim follows
from Theorem 5.2 and the assumption ln r ∈ o(lnx). 
In the following we will analyze the relation between the proposed notions in more
detail. Namely, we carefully check how each of the notions can be enclosed in terms of the
others. Clearly the fixed bound notions AFB(r,σ) enclose each other:
LEMMA 5.4. For r ∈ R>1, x ∈ R>1 and σ, σ′ ∈ [0, 1] with σ ≤ σ′ we have
#AFB(
√
r,1)
(
x/
√
r
) ≤ #AFB(r,0) (x) ≤ #AFB(r,σ) (x) ≤ #AFB(r,σ′) (x) ≤ #AFB(r,1) (x)
PROOF. For the first inequality simply observe that x/
√
r ≤ x. The remaining inequalities
follow from the fact that
√
rσx ≤
√
rσ′x whenever σ ≤ σ′. 
We can also enclose different notions by each other:
LEMMA 5.5. For r ∈ R>1 and x ∈ R>1 we have
1
2
#AFB(r,1) (x) ≤ 1
2
#ADM(r) (x) ≤ #AALG1(r) (x) ≤ #AFB(r2,1) (x)
PROOF. We prove every inequality separately. For an easier understanding of the proof a
look at Figure 5.1 is advised:
1
2#AFB(r,1) (x) ≤ 12#ADM(r) (x): Consider the double sum (4.5)
1
2
#AFB(r,1) (x) = 1
2
∑
p∈P∩]
√
x
r
,
√
rx]
∑
q∈P∩
]√
x
r
,x
p
]
1 =
∑
p∈P∩]
√
x
r
,
√
x]
∑
q∈P∩
]
p,x
p
]
1
due to the restriction p < q. This is exactly the second summand in (4.2).
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1
2#ADM(r) (x) ≤ #AALG1(r) (x): Consider again the double sum (4.2). We expand the
summation area for q (thus increasing the number of primepairs we count) in order
to obtain the sum (4.8) for the algorithmic notion: For the first summand we obtain
from p ≤√xr that rp ≤ xp and for the second summand from the same argument that
x
rp ≤ p. The third summand disappears while doing this, since the squares (which are
counted by the third summand) are now counted by the second summand. Thus we
can bound the whole sum from above by changing the summation area for q in this
way.
#AALG1(r) (x) ≤ #AFB(r2,1) (x): We proceed as in the previous step, by replacing in the
sum (4.8) the summation area for q: Since p ≤ √x, we obtain xrp ≥
√
x
r . Now since√
x ≤ r√x the claim follows. 
We actually can enclose the Decker & Moree notion even tighter by the fixed bound notion:
LEMMA 5.6. For r ∈ R>1 and x ∈ R>1 we have
#AFB(r,1) (x) ≤ #ADM(r) (x) ≤ #AFB(r2, 12 ) (x) .
PROOF. Assume
√
x
r < p < q ≤
√
rx and pq ≤ x. Then xr < pq ≤ x and q ≤ rp. If on
the other hand xr < pq ≤ x and p < q < rp, then xr2 < 1rpq < p2 < q2 < rpq ≤ rx and the
claim follows. 
All the inclusion described above are compatible to the result from Theorem 5.3. However,
many of the explicit inclusions are much tighter.
6. Generating RSA integers
In this section we analyze how to generate RSA integers properly. It completes the picture
and we found several implementations overlooking this kind of arguments.
We wish that all the algorithms generate integers with the following properties:
◦ If we fix x we should with at least overwhelming probability generate integers that are
a product of a prime pair in Ax.
◦ These integers (not the pairs) should be selected roughly uniformly at random.
◦ The algorithm should be efficient. In particular, it should need only few primality
tests.
For the first point note that we usually use probabilistic primality tests with a very low
error probability, for example Miller (1976), Rabin (1980), Solovay & Strassen (1977), or
Artjuhov (1966/67). Deterministic primality tests are also available but at present for these
purposes by far too slow.
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6.1. Rejection sampling. Assume that A is a [c1, c2]-balanced notion of RSA integers
with tolerance r. The easiest approach for generating a pair from A is based on von Neu-
mann’s rejection sampling method. For this the following definition comes in handy:
DEFINITION 6.1 (Banner). A banner is a graph-bounded notion of RSA inte-
gers such that for all x ∈ R>1 and for every prime p ∈ [B1(x), C1(x)] the
number fx(p) of primes in the interval [B2(p, x), C2(p, x)] is almost indepen-
dent of p in the following sense: max{fx(p) p∈[B1(x),C1(x)]∩P}
min{fx(p) p∈[B1(x),C1(x)]∩P} ∈ 1 + o (1) .
For example, a rectangular notion, where B2(p, x) and C2(p, x) do not depend on p,
is a banner. Now given any notion A of RSA integers we select a banner B of (almost)
minimal area enclosing Ax. Note that there may be many choices for B. We can easily
generate elements in Bx ∩N2: Select first an appropriate y ∈ [B1(x), C1(x)]∩N, second an
appropriate z ∈ [B2(p, x), C2(p, x)] ∩ N. By the banner property this chooses (y, z) almost
uniformly. We obtain the following straightforward Las Vegas algorithm:
ALGORITHM 6.2. Generating an RSA integer (Las Vegas version).
Input: A notion A, a bound x ∈ R>1.
Output: An integer n = pq with (p, q) ∈ Ax.
1. Repeat 2–4
2. Repeat
3. Select (y, z) at random from Bx ∩ N2 as just described.
4. Until (y, z) ∈ Ax.
5. Until y prime and z prime.
6. p← y, q ← z.
7. Return pq.
The expected repetition count of the inner loop is #B(x)#A(x) which is roughly
area(Bx)
area(Ax) . The
expected number of primality tests is about area(Ax)#A(x) . By Theorem 5.3 this is for many notions
in O (ln2 x). We have seen implementations (for example the one of GnuPG) where the
inner and outer loop have been exchanged. This increases the number of primality tests by
the repetition count of the inner loop. For AFB(r,1) this is a factor of about
ln y
ln z
#AFB(r2,0) (rx)
#AFB(r,1) (x) ∼
1
r − 2 + r
ln r + 1r − 1
=
(r − 1)2
r(ln r − 1) + 1 ,
which for r = 2 is equal to 2.58 and even worse for larger r.∗ Also easily checkable
additional conditions, like gcd((p−1)(q−1), e) = 1, should be checked before the primality
tests to improve the efficiency.
∗Side remark: to indicate how a real number was rounded we append a special symbol. Examples: pi =
3.14 = 3.142 = 3.1416 = 3.14159 . The height of the platform shows the size of the left-out part and
the direction of the antenna indicates whether actual value is larger or smaller than displayed. We write, say,
e = 2.72 = 2.71 as if the shorthand were exact.
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6.2. Inverse transform sampling. Actually we would like to avoid generating out-of-
bound pairs completely. Then a straightforward attempt to construct such an algorithm looks
the following way:
ALGORITHM 6.3. Generating an RSA integer (non-uniform version).
Input: A notion A, a bound x ∈ R>1.
Output: An integer n = pq with (p, q) ∈ Ax.
1. Repeat
2. Select y uniformly at random from {y ∈ R ∃z ∈ N : (y, z) ∈ Ax} ∩ N.
3. Until y prime.
4. p← y.
5. Repeat
6. Select z uniformly at random from {z ∈ R (p, z) ∈ Ax} ∩ N.
7. Until z prime.
8. q ← z.
9. Return pq.
The main problem with Algorithm 6.3 is that the output it produces typically is not uniform
since the sets {z ∈ R (p, z) ∈ Ax} ∩ N do not necessarily have the same cardinality when
changing p. To retain uniform selection, we need to select the primes p non-uniformly with
the following distribution:
DEFINITION 6.4. Let A be a notion of RSA integers with tolerance r. For every x ∈ R>1
the associated cumulative distribution function of Ax is defined as
FAx :
R −→ [0, 1],
y 7−→ area(Ax∩([1,y]×R))
area(Ax) .
In fact we should use the function GAx : R → [0, 1], y 7→ #(Ax∩(([1,y]∩P)×P))#Ax , in order to
compute the density but computing GAx (or its inverse) is tremendously expensive. Fortu-
nately, by virtue of Lemma 3.6 we know that FAx approximates GAx quite well for mono-
tone, [c1, c2]-balanced notions A. So we use the function FAx to capture the distribution
properties of a given notion of RSA integers. As can be seen by inspection, in practically
relevant examples this function is sufficiently easy to handle, see Table 6.1. Using this we
modify Algorithm 6.3 such that each element from Ax is selected almost uniformly at ran-
dom:
ALGORITHM 6.5. Generating an RSA integer.
Input: A notion A, a bound x ∈ R>1.
Output: An integer n = pq with (p, q) ∈ Ax.
1. Repeat
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2. Select y with distribution FAx from {y ∈ R ∃z : (y, z) ∈ Ax} ∩ N.
3. Until y prime.
4. p← y.
5. Repeat
6. Select z uniformly at random from {z ∈ R (p, z) ∈ Ax} ∩ N.
7. Until z prime.
8. q ← z.
9. Return pq.
As desired, this algorithm generates any pair (p, q) ∈ Ax ∩ (P× P) with almost the same
probability. In order to generate y with distribution FAx one can use inverse transform
sampling, see for example Knuth (1998):
THEOREM 6.6 (Inverse transform sampling). Let F be a continuous cumulative distribution
function with inverse F−1 for u ∈ [0, 1] defined by
F−1(u) := inf {x ∈ R F (x) = u} .
If U is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], then F−1(U) follows the distribution F ′.
PROOF. We have prob(F−1(U) ≤ x) = prob(U ≤ F (x)) = F (x). 
The expected number of primality tests now is in O (lnx): If A is [c1, 1]-balanced then
FAx(y) = 0 as long as y ≤ xc1 . The exit probability of the first loop is prob(y prime) where
y is chosen according to the distribution F ′Ax . Thus
prob(y prime) ∼
∫ x
1
F ′Ax(y)
ln y
dy ∈
[
1
lnx
,
1
c1 lnx
]
and we expect O (lnx)∩Ω (c1 lnx) repetitions of the upper loop until y is prime. Of course
we have to take into account that for each trial u an inverse F−1Ax (u) has to be computed — at
least approximately —, yet this cost is usually negligible compared to a primality test, see
Table 6.1.
6.3. Other constructions. There are variants around, where the primes are selected dif-
ferently: Take an integer randomly from a suitable interval and increase the result until the
first prime is found. This has the advantage that the amount of randomness needed is consid-
erably lower and by optimizing the resulting algorithm can also be made much faster. The
price one has to pay is that the produced primes will not be selected uniformly at random:
Primes p for which p − 2 is also prime will be selected with a much lower probability than
randomly selected primes of a given length. As shown in Brandt & Damgård (1993) the
output entropy of such algorithms is still almost maximal and also generators based on these
kind of prime-generators might be used in practice.
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Notion A F ′Ax Plot
ADM(r)

2(r2y2−x)
xy(r−1) ln r if
√
x
r
< y ≤√x
r
,
2r(x−y2)
xy(r−1) ln r if
√
x
r
< y ≤ √x,
0 otherwise. y
AFB(r,σ)

√
r
(
r
1+σ
2 −1
)
√
x
(
σr ln r+r−2r
1+σ
2 +1
) if√x
r
< y ≤√ x
rσ
,
r
√
x−√ry
√
xy
(
σr ln r+r−2r
1+σ
2 +1
) if√ x
rσ
< y ≤ √rσx,
0 otherwise.
y
AALG1(r)
{
1
y ln r if
√
x
r
< y ≤ √x,
0 otherwise. y
Table 6.1: Non-cumulative density functions with respect to y.
6.4. Comparison. We have seen that Algorithm 6.2 and 6.5 are practical uniform genera-
tors for any symmetric or antisymmetric notion.
Note that Algorithm 6.2 and 6.5 may, however, still produce numbers in a non-uniform
fashion: In the last step of both algorithms a product is computed that corresponds to either
one pair or two pairs inAx. To solve this problem we have two choices: Either we replace A
by its symmetric version S defined by Sx :=
{
(y, z) ∈ R2>1 (y, z) ∈ Ax ∨ (z, y) ∈ Ax
}
,
or by its, say, top half T given by Tx := {(y, z) ∈ Sx z ≥ y} before anything else.
It is now relatively simple to instantiate the above algorithms using the notions proposed
in Section 4: Namely for an algorithm following the Las Vegas approach, one simply needs
to find suitable banner that encloses the desired notion. In order to instantiate Algorithm 6.5
we need to determine the inverse of the corresponding cumulative distribution function for
the respective notion (see Table 6.1). Still Algorithm 6.2 and 6.5 are practically uniform
generators for any symmetric or antisymmetric notion. Considering run-times we observe
that Algorithm 6.5 is much faster, but we have to use inverse transform sampling to generate
the first prime. Despite the simplicity of the approaches some common implementations use
corrupted versions of Algorithm 6.2 or 6.5 as explained below. Essentially, they buy some
extra simplicity by relaxing the uniformity requirement.
7. Output entropy
The entropy of the output distribution is an important quality measure of a generator. For
primality tests several analyses where performed, see for example Brandt & Damgård (1993)
or Joye & Paillier (2006). For generators of RSA integers we are not aware of any work in
this direction.
LetAx be any monotone notion. Consider a generator G̺ that produces a pair of primes
(p, q) ∈ Ax with distribution ̺. Seen as random variables, G̺ induces two random variables
P and Q by its first and the second coordinate, respectively. The entropy of the generator
28 Loebenberger & Nüsken
G̺ is given by
(7.1) H(G̺) = H(P ×Q) = H(P ) +H (Q P ) ,
where H denotes the entropy and the conditional entropy is given by
H (Q P ) = −
∑
p∈P
prob(P = p)
∑
q∈Q
prob(Q = q | P = p) log2(prob(Q = q | P = p)).
If ̺ is the uniform distribution U we obtain the maximal entropy, which we can approximate
by Lemma 3.6, namely
H(GU ) = log2(#A (x)) ≈ log2(area(Ax))− log2(lnx) + 1
with an error of very small order. The algorithms from Section 6, however, return the product
P ·Q. The entropy of this random variable is at most H(P ×Q) and can be at most one bit
smaller than this:
H(P ·Q) = −
∑
n=pq∈N
(p,q)∈Ax
prob(P ·Q = n) log2(prob(P ·Q = n))
≥ −
∑
(p,q)∈Ax
prob(P ×Q = (p, q)) log2(2 prob(P ×Q = (p, q)))
= H(P ×Q)− 1.
One should note here that in real-world implementations the generation of the primes might
be biased, for example when one uses the above mentioned quite natural generator PRIMEINC,
analyzed in Brandt & Damgård 1993. PRIMEINC chooses an integer and then outputs the
first prime equal to or larger than this number. Note that Algorithm 6.2 and Algorithm 6.5
do not depend on any prime generator but sample integers until they are prime. However,
this is not the case in many standards and implementations discussed in Section 9.
To estimate the entropy of an RSA generator G = P × Q when employing prime gen-
erators P and Q with with entropy-loss at most εP and εQ then the resulting generator will
by (7.1) have an entropy-loss of at most εP + εQ when compared to the same generator
employing generators that produce primes uniformly at random.
Interestingly, some of the standards and implementations in Section 9 (like the standard
IEEE 1363-2000 or the implementation of GNU Crypto) still do not generate every pos-
sible outcome with the same probability, even if uniform prime generators are employed:
Namely, if one selects the prime p uniformly at random and afterwards the prime q uni-
formly at random from an appropriate interval then this might be a non-uniform selection
process if for some choices of p there are less choices for q.
If in general the probability distribution ̺ is close to the uniform distribution, say ̺(p, q) ∈
[2−ε, 2ε] 1#A(x) for some fixed ε ∈ R>0, then the entropy of the resulting generator G̺ can
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be estimated as follows:
H(G̺) = −
∑
(p,q)∈Ax
̺(p, q) log2(̺(p, q))
∈
∑
(p,q)∈Ax
̺(p, q)[log2(#A (x))− ε, log2(#A (x)) + ε]
= [H(GU )− ε,H(GU ) + ε]
and since the entropy of the uniform distribution is maximal, this implies that
H(GU )− ε ≤ H(G̺) ≤ H(GU ).
8. Complexity theoretic considerations
We are about to reduce factoring products of two comparatively equally sized primes to the
problem of factoring integers generated from a sufficiently large notion. As far as we know
there are no similar reductions in the literature.
We consider finite sets M ⊂ N × N, in our situation we actually have only prime pairs.
The multiplication map µM is defined on M and merely multiplies, that is, µM : M →
N, (y, z) 7→ y · z. The random variable UM outputs uniformly distributed values from M .
An attacking algorithm F gets a natural number µM (UM ) and attempts to find factors inside
M . Its success probability
succF (M) = prob
(
F (µM (UM )) ∈ µ−1M (µM (UM ))
)(8.1)
measures its quality in any fixed-size scenario. We call a countably infinite family C of
finite sets of pairs of natural numbers hard to factor iff for any probabilistic polynomial time
algorithm F and any exponent s for all but finitely many M ∈ C the success probability
succF (M) ≤ ln−s x where x = maxµM (M). In other words: the success probability of
any probabilistic polynomial time factoring algorithm on a number chosen uniformly from
M ∈ C is negligible. That is equivalent to saying that the function family (µM )M∈C is
one-way.
Integers generated from a notion A are hard to factor iff for any sequence (xi)i∈N tend-
ing to infinity the family (Axi ∩ (P × P))i∈N is hard to factor. This definition is equivalent
to the requirement that for all probabilistic polynomial time machines F , all s ∈ N, there
exists a value x0 ∈ R>1 such that for any x > x0 we have succF (Ax) ≤ ln−s x. Since R is
first-countable, both definitions are actually equal. This can be easily shown by considering
the functions gs,F : R>1 → R, x 7→ succF (Ax) · lns x. The first definition says that each
function gs,F is sequentially continuous (after swapping the initial universal quantifiers).
The second definition says that each function gs,F is continuous. In first-countable spaces
sequentially continuous is equivalent to continuous.
For any polynomial f we define the set Rf = {(m,n) ∈ N m ≤ f(n) ∧ n ≤ f(m)} of f -
related positive integer pairs. Denote by P(m) the set of m-bit primes. We can now formulate
the basic assumption:
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ASSUMPTION 8.2 (Intractability of factoring). For any unbounded positive polynomial f
integers from the f -related prime pair family (P(m) × P(n))(m,n)∈Rf are hard to factor.
This is exactly the definition given by Goldreich (2001). Note that this assumption implies
that factoring in general is hard, and it covers the supposedly hardest factoring instances.
Now we are ready to state that integers from all relevant notions are hard to factor.
THEOREM 8.3. Let ln r ∈ Ω
(
1−2c1
lnℓ x
)
for some ℓ and A be a piecewise monotone, [c1, c2]-
balanced notion for RSA integers of tolerance r, where c1 is bounded away from zero with
growing x, and A has large area, namely, for some k and large x we have areaAx ≥ xlnk x .
Assume that factoring is difficult in the sense of Assumption 8.2. Then integers from the
notion A are hard to factor.
Actually, under the given conditions Assumption 8.2 can be weakened: we only need that
integers from the family of linearly related prime pairs are hard to factor. There is a tradeoff
between the strength of the needed assumption on factoring and the assumption on c1. If
we relax the restriction on c1 in the statement of the theorem to the requirement that c21 lnx
tends to infinity with growing x, we need that integers from the family of quadratically
related prime pairs are hard to factor.
PROOF. Assume that we have an algorithm F that factors integers generated uniformly
from the notion A. Our goal is to prove that this algorithm also factors certain polynomially
related prime pairs successfully. In other words: its existence contradicts the assumption
that factoring in the form of Assumption 8.2 is difficult.
By assumption, there is an exponent s so that for any x0 there is x > x0 such that the
assumed algorithm F has success probability succF (Ax) ≥ ln−s x on inputs from Ax. We
are going to prove that for each such x there exists a pair (m0, n0), the entries both from the
interval [c1 lnx−ln 2, c2 lnx+ln 2], such that F executed with an input from image µPm0 ,Pn0
still has success probability at least ln−(s+k) x. By the interval restriction, m0 and n0 are
polynomially (even linearly) related, namely m0 < 2c2c1 n0 and n0 <
2c2
c1
m0 for large x.
By the assumption on c1 the fraction 2c2c1 is bounded independent of x. So that contradicts
Assumption 8.2.
First, we cover the set Ax with small rectangles. Let Sm,n := P(m) × P(n) and Ix :={
(m,n) ∈ N2 Sm,n ∩ Ax 6= ∅
}
then
Ax ∩ P2 ⊆
⊎
(m,n)∈Ix
Sm,n =: Sx.(8.4)
Next we give an upper bound on the number #Sx of prime pairs in the set Sx in terms
of the number #A (x) of prime pairs in the original notion: First, since each rectangle Sm,n
extends by a factor 2 along each axis we overshoot by at most that factor in each direction,
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that is, we have for c′1 = c1 − (1 + 2c1) ln 2ln x and all x ∈ R>1
Sx ⊂M16r,c
′
1
4x =
{
(y, z) ∈ R2 y, z ≥ 1
2
xc1 ∧ x
4r
< yz ≤ 4x
}
.
Provided x is large enough we can guarantee by Theorem 5.2 that
#Sx ≤ #M16r,c′1 (4x) ≤ 8x
c′21 lnx
.
On the other hand side we apply Lemma 3.6 for the notion Ax and use that Ax is large
by assumption. Let c = max (2c2 − 1, 1− 2c1). Then we obtain for large x with some
eA(x) ∈ O
(
c−11 x
3+c
4
)
.
#A (x) ≥ area(Ax)
c22 ln2 x
− eA(x) ≥ x
2c22 lnk+2 x
.
Together we obtain
#A (x)
#Sx
≥ c
′2
1
16c22 lnk+1 x
≥ ln−(k+2) x(8.5)
By assumption we have succF (Ax) ≥ ln−s x for infinitely many values x. Thus F on
an input from Sx still has large success even if we ignore that F might be successful for
elements on Sx \ Ax,
succF (Sx) ≥ succF (Ax)#A (x)
#Sx
≥ ln−(k+s+2) x.
Finally choose (m0, n0) ∈ Ix for which the success of F on Sm0,n0 is maximal. Then
succF (Sm0,n0) ≥ succF (Sx). Combining with the previous we obtain that for infinitely
many x there is a pair (m0, n0) where the success succF (Sm0,n0) of F on inputs from
Sm0,n0 is still larger than inverse polynomial: succF (Sm0,n0) ≥ ln−(k+s+2) x.
For these infinitely many pairs (m0, n0) the success probability of the algorithm F on
Sm0,n0 is at least ln−(k+s+2) x contradicting the hypothesis. 
All the specific notions that we have found in the literature fulfill the criterion of Theo-
rem 8.3. Thus if factoring is difficult in the stated sense then each of them is invulnerable
to factoring attacks. Note that the above reduction still works if the primes p, q are due to
the side condition gcd((p − 1)(q − 1), e) = 1 for a fixed integer e (see Theorem 3.11). We
suspect that this is also the case when one employes safe primes.
Miha˘ilescu (2001) shows a theorem which is in some respect more general than our
considerations and seems to imply our Theorem 8.3. To that end one has to show that one of
Ax and P(m) × P(n), with suitably chosen (m,n) depending on x, is ‘polynomially dense’
in the other. The result would be more general since also the used distribution on Ax, rather
than being uniform, is allowed to be ‘polynomially bounded’. Our proof is of a different
nature and thus may well be of independent interest. Also it may be adapted to polynomially
bounded distributions on A.
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9. Impact on standards and implementations
In order to get an understanding of the common implementations, it is necessary to consult
the main standard on RSA integers, namely the standard PKCS#1 (Jonsson & Kaliski 2003).
However, one cannot find any requirements on the shape of RSA integers there. Interest-
ingly, they even allow more than two factors for an RSA modulus. Also the standard ISO
18033-2 (International Organization for Standards 2006) does not give any details besides
the fact that it requires the RSA integer to be a product of two different primes of simi-
lar length. A more precise standard is set by the German Bundesnetzagentur (Wohlmacher
2009). They do not give a specific algorithm, but at least require that the prime factors are
not too small and not too close to each other. We will now analyze several standards which
give a concrete algorithm for generating an RSA integer. In particular, we consider the
standard of the RSA foundation (RSA Laboratories 2000), the IEEE standard 1363 (IEEE
working group 2000), the NIST standard FIPS 186-3 (NIST 2009), the standard ANSI X9.44
(Accredited Standards Committee X9 2007) and the standard resulting from the European
NESSIE project (Preneel et al. 2003).
9.1. RSA-OAEP. The RSA Laboratories (2000) describe the following variant:
ln y
ln z
ALGORITHM 9.1. Generating an RSA number for RSA-OAEP and variants.
Input: A number of bits k, the public exponent e.
Output: A number n = pq.
1. Pick p from
[⌊
2(k−1)/2
⌋
+ 1,
⌈
2k/2
⌉− 1] ∩ P such that
gcd(e, p − 1) = 1.
2. Pick q from
[⌊
2(k−1)/2
⌋
+ 1,
⌈
2k/2
⌉− 1] ∩ P such that
gcd(e, q − 1) = 1.
3. Return pq.
This will produce a number from the interval [2k−1+1, 2k−1] and no cutting off. The output
entropy is maximal. So this corresponds to the notion AFB(2,0) generated by Algorithm 6.5.
The standard requires an expected number of k ln 2 primality tests if the gcd condition is
checked first. Otherwise the expected number of primality tests increases to ϕ(e)ϕ1(e) · k ln 2,
see (3.12). We will in the following always mean by the above notation that the second
condition is checked first and afterwards the number is tested for primality. For the security
Theorem 8.3 applies.
9.2. IEEE. IEEE standard 1363-2000, Annex A.16.11 (IEEE working group 2000) intro-
duces our algorithmic proposal:
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ALGORITHM 9.2. Generating an RSA number, IEEE 1363-2000.
Input: A number of bits k, the odd public exponent e.
Output: A number n = pq.
1. Pick p from
[
2⌊ k−12 ⌋, 2⌊ k+12 ⌋ − 1
]
∩ P such that
gcd(e, p − 1) = 1.
2. Pick q from
[⌊
2k−1
p + 1
⌋
,
⌊
2k
p
⌋]
∩ P such that
gcd(e, q − 1) = 1.
3. Return pq.
Since the resulting integers are in the interval [2k−1, 2k−1] this standard followsAALG(2,1/2)
generated by a corrupted variant of Algorithm 6.5 using an expected number of k ln 2 pri-
mality tests like the RSA-OAEP standard. The notion it implements is neither symmetric
nor antisymmetric. The selection of the integers is not done in a uniform way, since the
number of possible q for the largest possible p is roughly half of the corresponding number
for the smallest possible p. Since the distribution of the outputs is close to uniform, we can
use the techniques from Section 7 to estimate the output entropy to find that the entropy-loss
is less than 0.69 bit. The (numerically approximated) values in Table 9.1 gave an actual
entropy-loss of approximately 0.03 bit.
9.3. NIST. We will now analyze the standard FIPS 186-3 (NIST 2009). In Appendix
B.3.1 of the standard one finds the following algorithm:
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ALGORITHM 9.3. Generating an RSA number, FIPS186-3.
Input: A number of bits k, a number of bits ℓ < k, the odd public
exponent 216 < e < 2256.
Output: A number n = pq.
1. Pick p from
[√
2 2k/2−1, 2k/2 − 1] ∩ P such that
gcd(e, p − 1) = 1 and p ± 1 has a prime factor with at least ℓ
bits.
2. Pick q from
[√
2 2k/2−1, 2k/2 − 1] ∩ P such that
gcd(e, p − 1) = 1 and q ± 1 has a prime factor with at least ℓ
bits and |p− q| > 2k/2−100.
3. Return pq.
In the standard it is required that the primes p and q shall be either provably prime or at
least probable primes. The mentioned large (at least ℓ-bit) prime factors of p± 1 and q ± 1
have to be provable primes. We observe that also in this standard a variant of the notion
AFB(2,0) generated by Algorithm 6.5 is used. The output entropy is thus maximal. However,
we do not have any restriction on the parity of k, such that the value k/2 is not necessarily
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an integer. Another interesting point is the restriction on the prime factors of p ± 1, q ± 1.
Our notions cannot directly handle such requirements, but this may possibly be achieved by
appropriately modifying the prime number densities in the proof of Lemma 3.6.
The standard requires an expected number of slightly more than k ln 2 primality tests.
It is thus slightly less efficient than the RSA-OAEP standard. For the security the remarks
from the end of Section 8 apply.
9.4. ANSI. The ANSI X9.44 standard (Accredited Standards Committee X9 2007), for-
merly part of ANSI X9.31, requires strong primes for an RSA modulus. Unfortunately,
we could not access ANSI X9.44 directly and are therefore referring to ANSI X9.31-1998.
Section 4.1.2 of the standard requires that
◦ p−1, p+1, q−1, q+1 each should have prime factors p1, p2, q1, q2 that are randomly
selected primes in the range 2100 to 2120,
◦ p and q shall be the first primes that meet the above, found in an appropriate interval,
starting from a random point,
◦ p and q shall be different in at least one of their first 100 bits.
The additional restrictions are similar to the ones required by NIST. This procedure will have
an output entropy that is close to maximal (see Section 7).
9.5. NESSIE. The European NESSIE project gives in its security report (Preneel et al.
2003) a very similar algorithm:
ln y
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ALGORITHM 9.4. Generating an RSA number, NESSIE standard.
Input: A number of bits ℓ, the odd public exponent e.
Output: A number n = pq.
1. Pick p from
[
2ℓ−1, 2ℓ − 1] ∩ P such that
gcd(e, p − 1) = 1.
2. Pick q from
[
2ℓ−1, 2ℓ − 1] ∩ P such that
gcd(e, q − 1) = 1.
3. Return pq.
The resulting integer n is from the interval [22ℓ−2, 22ℓ − 1] and thus corresponds to the
fixed-bound notion AFB(4,0) generated by Algorithm 6.5. The output entropy is thus max-
imal. Note the difference to the standard of the RSA foundation: Besides the fact, that in
the standard of the RSA laboratories some sort of rounding is done, the security parameter
ℓ is treated differently: While for the RSA foundation the security parameter describes the
(rough) length of the output, in the NESSIE proposal it denotes the size of the two prime
factors. For comparison let k = 2ℓ. The standards requires an expected number of 2k ln 2
primality tests. It is thus as efficient as the RSA-OAEP standard. For the security Theo-
rem 8.3 applies.
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9.6. OpenSSL. We now turn to implementations: For OpenSSL (Cox et al. 2009), we
refer to the file rsa_gen.c. Note that in the configuration the routine used for RSA integer
generation can be changed, while the algorithm given below is the standard one. OpenSSH
(de Raadt et al. 2009) uses the same library. Refer to the file rsa.c. We have the following
algorithm:
ln y
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ALGORITHM 9.5. Generating an RSA number in OpenSSL.
Input: A number of bits k.
Output: A number n = pq.
1. Pick p from
[
2⌊ k−12 ⌋, 2⌊ k+12 ⌋ − 1
]
∩ P.
2. Pick q from
[
2⌊ k−32 ⌋, 2⌊ k−12 ⌋ − 1
]
∩ P.
3. Return pq.
This is nothing but a rejection-sampling method with no rejections of a notion similar to
the fixed-bound notion AFB(4,0) generated by Algorithm 6.2. The output entropy is thus
maximal. The result the algorithm produces is always in [2k−2, 2k − 1]. It is clear that this
notion is antisymmetric and the factors are on average a factor 2 apart of each other. The
implementation runs in an expected number of k ln 2 primality tests. The public exponent e
is afterwards selected such that gcd((p− 1)(q − 1), e) = 1. It is thus slightly more efficient
than the RSA-OAEP standard. For the security Theorem 8.3 applies.
9.7. Openswan. In the open source implementation Openswan of the IPsec protocol
(Richardson et al. 2009) one finds a rejection-sampling method that is actually implement-
ing the notion AFB(4,0) generated by a variant of Algorithm 6.2. We refer to the function
rsasigkey in the file rsasigkey.c:
ln y
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ALGORITHM 9.6. Generating an RSA number in Openswan.
Input: A number of bits k.
Output: A number n = pq.
1. Pick p from
[
2⌊ k−22 ⌋, 2⌊ k2⌋ − 1
]
∩ P.
2. Pick q from
[
2⌊ k−22 ⌋, 2⌊ k2⌋ − 1
]
∩ P.
3. Return pq.
Note that here the notion is actually symmetric. However still the uniformly at random
selected number pq will not always have the same length. The implementation runs in an
expected number of k ln 2 primality tests and output entropy is maximal. Again the public
exponent e is afterwards selected such that gcd((p− 1)(q − 1), e) = 1. It is thus as efficient
as the RSA-OAEP standard. For the security Theorem 8.3 applies.
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9.8. GnuPG. Also GnuPG (Skala et al. 2009) uses rejection-sampling of the fixed-bound
notion AFB(2,1) generated by a variant of Algorithm 6.2, implying that the entropy of its
output distribution is maximal.
ln y
ln z
ALGORITHM 9.7. Generating an RSA number in GnuPG.
Input: A number of bits k.
Output: A number n = pq.
1. Repeat 2–3
2. Pick p from
[
2⌊ k−12 ⌋, 2⌊ k+12 ⌋ − 1
]
∩ P.
3. Pick q from
[
2⌊k−12 ⌋, 2⌊ k+12 ⌋ − 1
]
∩ P.
4. Until len(pq) = 2 ⌈k/2⌉
5. Return pq.
The hatched region in the picture above shows the possible outcomes that are discarded. We
refer here to the file rsa.c. The algorithm is given in the function generate_std and
produces always numbers with either k or k + 1 bits depending on the parity of k. Note
that the generation procedure indeed first selects primes before checking the validity of the
range. This is of course a waste of resources, see Section 6.
The implementation runs in an expected number of roughly 2.589 · (k + 1) ln 2 pri-
mality tests. It is thus less efficient than the RSA OAEP standards. Like in the other
so far considered implementations, the public exponent e is afterwards selected such that
gcd((p − 1)(q − 1), e) = 1. For the security Theorem 8.3 applies.
9.9. GNU Crypto. The GNU Crypto library (Free Software Foundation 2009) gener-
ates RSA integers the following way. Refer here to the function generate in the file
RSAKeyPairGenerator.java.
ln y
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ALGORITHM 9.8. Generating an RSA number in GNU Crypto.
Input: A number of bits k.
Output: A number n = pq.
1. Pick p from
[
2⌊ k−12 ⌋, 2⌊ k+12 ⌋ − 1
]
∩ P.
2. Repeat
3. Pick q from
[
2⌊k−12 ⌋, 2⌊ k+12 ⌋ − 1
]
.
4. Until len(pq) = k and q ∈ P.
5. Return pq.
The arrow in the picture points to the results that will occur with higher probability. Also
here the notionAFB(2,1) is used, but the generated numbers will not be uniformly distributed,
since for a larger p we have much less choices for q. Since the distribution of the outputs is
Notions for RSA integers 37
Standard Notion Entropy (entropy loss) RemarksImplementation k = 768 k = 1024 k = 2048
PKCS#1
Undefined — — — —ISO 18033-2
ANSI X9.44
FIPS 186-3 AFB(2,0) . 747.34 . 1002.51 . 2024.51 strong primes
(& 0 h) (& 0 h) (& 0 h)
RSA-OAEP AFB(2,0) 747.34 1002.51 2024.51 —
(0 h) (0 h) (0 h)
IEEE 1363-2000 AALG(2, 12 ) 749.33 1004.50 2026.50 non-uniform
(0.04 h) (0.03 h) (0.01 h)
NESSIE AFB(4,0) 749.89 1005.06 2027.06 —
(0 h) (0 h) (0 h)
GNU Crypto AFB(2,1) 747.89 1003.06 2025.06 non-uniform
(0.84 h) (0.62 h) (0.31 h)
GnuPG AFB(2,1) 748.52 1003.69 2025.69 —
(0 h) (0 h) (0 h)
OpenSSL ∼= AFB(4,0) 749.89 1005.06 2027.06 —
(0 h) (0 h) (0 h)
Openswan AFB(4,0) 749.89 1005.06 2027.06 —
(0 h) (0 h) (0 h)
Table 9.1: Overview of various standards and implementations. The numbers in parentheses
give the entropy loss for each algorithm in per mille. As explained in the text, the entropy
of the standards is sightly smaller than the values given due to the fixed public exponent e.
FIPS 186-3 has a small entropy loss because of the requirement of strong primes. Generators
based on nonuniform prime generation suffer extra entropy loss, see page 28.
not close to uniform, we could only compute the entropy for real-world parameter choices
numerically (see Table 9.1). For all choices the loss was less than 0.63 bit. The implemen-
tation is as efficient as the RSA-OAEP standard.
The Free Software Foundation provides GNU Classpath, which generates RSA inte-
gers exactly like the GNU Crypto library, i.e. following AFB(2,1). We refer to the source
file named RSAKeyPairGenerator.java. As in the other so far considered imple-
mentations the public exponent e is randomly selected afterwards such that gcd((p− 1)(q−
1), e) = 1. Like in the IEEE and the ANSI standard this does not impose practical security
risks, but it does not meet the requirement of uniform selection of the generated integers.
9.10. Summary. It is striking to observe that not a single analyzed implementation fol-
lows one of the standards described above. The only standards all implementations are
compliant to are the standards PKCS#1 and ISO 18033-2, which themselves do not specify
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anything related to the integer generation routine. We found that also the requirements from
the algorithm catalog of the German Bundesnetzagentur (Wohlmacher 2009) are not met in
a single considered implementation, since it is never checked whether the selected primes
are too close to each other. The implementation that almost meets the requirements is the
implementation of OpenSSL. Interestingly there are standards and implementations around
that generate integers non-uniformly. Prominent examples are the IEEE and the ANSI stan-
dards and the implementation of the GNU Crypto library. This does not impose practical
security issues, but it violates the condition of uniform selection.
10. Conclusion
We have seen that there are various definitions for RSA integers, which result in substan-
tially differing standards. We have shown that the concrete specification does not essentially
affect the (cryptographic) properties of the generated integers: The entropy of the output
distribution is always almost maximal, generating those integers can be done efficiently, and
the outputs are hard to factor if factoring in general is hard in a suitable sense. It remains
open to incorporate strong primes into our model. Also a tight bound for the entropy of
non-uniform selection is missing if the distribution is not close to uniform.
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